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State Expenditures in 1998-2006
Svetla Kostadinova, Dimitar Chobanov
This week the expenditures by functions of the
budget for the period 1998-2006 have been
published. It is interesting to look at them
because they clearly show on what exactly the
money from taxes is spent.
The reduction of total expenditures in relation to
the GDP creates a significant impression, as in
2006 they reach their lowest rate for the entire
period (37.2%). Keeping the incomes on
relatively fixed levels leads to an increase in the
budget surplus. Instead the released resources
could be used for reducing the tax burden.
The expenditures for social security, social
assistance, and welfare represent the highest
share, as a percentage, of GDP. This is normal as
we take into consideration the lack of resources
in the insurance funds, the rate of
unemployment, as well as the occasionally
generous social payments. Despite that, a
decrease in these expenditures is observed for
the last 3 years, which is a good trend if
preserved. However, examining the whole
period from 1998 to 2006 we notice a slight
increase in these expenditures.
On the second place, as a share of the budget,
are the expenditures for defense and security, as
this trend is very astonishing for a small country
like Bulgaria. In this area in the last years a
smooth decrease is also observed, but the
decrease is very insignificant compared to what
is possible in reality. Here are included the
expenditures for the police and judicial system,
which seem rather ineffective taking into
consideration the petty protection of the property
rights in the country.
Another interesting detail is the expenditures for
economic activities and services, third in size, in
the budget as a percentage of GDP. Here are
included the different programs, subsidies for
certain areas such as the agriculture, energy
sector, transport, and other industries, as well as
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the expenditures for infrastructure. They
represent 4.5% of GDP in 2006 and are at a
relatively fixed rate. Practically this means that
the country still tangibly participates in spheres
of the economy which are not typical of it,
instead of giving the chance to the private sector
to undertake the costs, investments, and the
management of these activities. In this respect
that creates grounds for corruption, ineffective
expenditures and incapability to reduce the tax
burden due to the indispensable financing of
these expenditures.
Increase in the expenditures for the period 2004-
2006 is observed in the area of general state
services, which means that the present
government actually spends more money on
administration and different public utilities. On
the one hand, this is a result of the increase in
the number of state administration, and, on the
other hand, it is a result of the income policy
which uses as an instrument the salaries in the
budget sector in order to influence the salaries in
the private sector.
Instead of a conclusion
The most general conclusions would be the
following:
· There is a reduction of the expenditures
in certain areas of the economy, but that
has not stimulated the government to
significantly reduce the highest taxes -
taxes over labor. That is why the social
expenditures in the budget are also the
highest and do not significantly
decrease during the years.
· It is apparent that there are solid
resources for reducing the tax burden
through an increase in the effectiveness
of the expenditures and a decrease in
the budget surplus.
· The high government spending is not
tantamount to a just society. The
substantial expenditures mean high
taxes, highly distributive role of the
government, and restriction of the
individual freedom of citizens. In many
of the countries with significant
government spending the low-
productive majority lives on the back of
the highly-productive minority, which
finances the government expenditures.
Budget expenditures for general state services
(% of GDP)
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
4.0%
4.5%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Budget expenditures for economic activities and services (%
of GDP)
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Expenditures for education (% of GDP)
3.7%
3.8%
3.9%
4.0%
4.1%
4.2%
4.3%
4.4%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Expenditures for housing organization and public utilities
(% of GDP)
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Institute for Market Economics, Bulgaria
Economic Policy Review, issue 50, May 2007
3
Expenditures not classified by the other functions (% of GDP)
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The State Budget by March 2007
Dimitar Chobanov
The Ministry of Finance has recently announced
the data on the implementation of the state
budget toward the end of March 2007. The total
revenues in the consolidated budget reach 5.051
billion leva, and the total expenditures- 4.334
billion leva. Consequently, the surplus is 539.5
million leva, which is equivalent to around 1%
of the expected GDP for this year.
The growth of total revenues is more than the
growth of expenditures for the first three-month
period of the year. While the revenues in the
consolidated budget increase with 15.4%
compared to the same period in 2006, the
expenditures increase more slowly - with 9.8%.
The tax revenues rise with 12.2% which is
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mainly due to the revenues from corporate tax
and excise duties. While in the case of excise
duties the high contributions to the total
revenues are due to the rise in the rates, in the
case of profit tax the rate has been reduced to
10% in the beginning of the year. Although it is
early to make any explicit conclusions and the
revenues up to this moment are defined almost
completely by the former rate, the increase of
45% indicates that this measure reduces the
incentives for evasion and “brings to light” a
part of the profits in the economy. Business
possesses more affinity to pay, as the costs of
hiding are close to, or even exceed, the costs of
paying.
A stable increase in terms of the revenues from
the personal income tax is also observed - an
increase of 22.2% compared to the same period
of the preceding year, while the revenues from
social security contributions rise with 10.8%,
despite the redistribution of 1% point to the fully
funded pillar. A part of the explanation for this
increase lays down in the expansion of the base
due to higher incomes and employment. Still,
the extension of the range of personal income
tax, which already applies to foreign persons and
also affects the social expenditures, should also
be taken into consideration.
The development of the VAT revenues is
according to the expectations. While during the
first two months of 2007 a substantial decrease
in this indicator was registered - for example, in
January the decrease was with 30.7%, now the
decrease is with around 7.2%. The reason is that
the EU membership resulted in changed regime
of taxation. Yet till the end of the year a growth
in the VAT revenues is expected, as in this case
they will probably exceed the revenues, already
collected in 2006.
The growth of the expenditures in March
compared to the same period of the preceding
year is with 9.8% which represents an
acceleration of the rate compared to the first two
months of this year. The growth in January 2007
was moderate-2.6%, and in February-7.9%. In
comparison with 2006, during the whole year the
rate is 9.7%, while the increase in the nominal
GDP is with 14.7%. This development allowed
for the reduction to the lowest value of the
percentage of state expenditures for
manufactured goods in the last years.
Maintaining this policy by the government (the
policy of slower increase in the state
expenditures in relation to GDP) will also allow
for a decrease in the redistribution through the
budget. This means that it is possible to follow a
conservative fiscal policy by means of sustaining
a surplus, and in addition certain resources will
be made available for a reduction of the tax
burden.
The recent proposals by one of the parties from
the ruling coalition do not unfortunately
correspond with such a policy. The proposed
ideas are mostly directed to a solid increase in
the government expenditures, however without
being accompanied by any intentions for their
optimization. Still, in the framework of the
coalition, and mostly from the standpoint of the
Ministry of Finance, these proposals might not
be even approved and implemented.
The execution of the budget during the first three
months of the year is a result of the positive
development of the economy. The hypothesis
that people act rationally in principle and react to
the fiscal stimuli is confirmed. The reduction of
some tax rates is effective and leads to higher
incomes and employment, and to a more
adequate account of these indicators in the
government statistics. The percentage of the
“gray economy” is still high, which could be
changed through a further reduction of taxes.
This reduction can occur through optimization
and, accordingly, through restriction of the
growth of state expenditures. The way to do this
is to extend the reforms in the pension system,
healthcare, education, public administration, and
management of state property. It is the
sustenance of a long-term stability and
improvement of the effectiveness of these
expenditures that should be the major goal of
every government.
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A Perspective over the EU Funds
Adriana Mladenova
The threat of not being able to master the money
from the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds and
from the agricultural subsidies is one of the
widespread and extensively discussed topics in
the public space. Although our country joined
the EU on 1 January 2007, the programs of the
EU Funds, as well as the application process,
have not started functioning yet. But in the first
two months the state made its mandatory
contribution to the EU budget to the amount of
146,6 million leva. According to the treaty
obligations with the EU, Bulgaria should
contribute to the budget of the Union 1,2% of its
annual GDP, as the amount for 2007 is expected
to exceed 640 million leva. In exchange for
these payments the state receives a share of the
EU budget in the form of subsidies and
gratuitous relief funds. The subsidies and relief
funds amount to the large sum of 4,6 billion leva
for 2007-2009 period, which is allocated in the
following spheres:
1) Agriculture- 1,5 billion euro
2) Policies of restructuring (building of
infrastructure, competition between
firms, and regional development)- 2,3
billion euro
3) Domestic policies, improvement of the
administration, and budget
compensations- 730 million euro
Assimilation of the EU Funds from the new
member-states
The Ministry of Finance has published data on
the financial implementation of the pre-
accession programs in Bulgaria toward the end
of March 2007. The data might be an original
indication for the future assimilation of the
instruments of the structural funds and financial
resources, provided for the implementation of
CAP (Common Agricultural Policy), although
these funds, only for 3 years, represent more
than two times the budget of the pre-accession
programs.
The data shows that the implementation of
SAPARD program (which finances the
agriculture and food, wine, and tobacco
industries) is 95%, while the implementation of
FAR program is 64% and of ISPA program
(which finances infrastructural projects on the
national level) is 43%. As ISPA has the biggest
share in the aggregate amount of the resources
provided from the pre-accession programs, the
assimilation in the beginning of 2007 represents
on the average around 60% of the total amount
of the funds. The situation in Romania is similar.
The implementation of SAPARD program is
over 95%, and of ISPA program is around 35%.
This indicates that in these two countries there is
a lack of willingness for managing big
infrastructural projects, as this reluctance is
often prompted by political reasons or
insufficient financial and management capacity
of the local authorities to implement
infrastructural projects.
The leader in the assimilation of the EU funds
from 8 of the newly-accepted EU member-states
is Slovenia, which in October 2006 agreed upon
43% of the budget, provided for subsidies and
relief funds for the period. The second place is
taken by Estonia with 39%, followed by
Hungary-31% of the resources provided by the
agreement. The last places of the “assimilation
contest” are taken by the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and Poland which have agreed upon
around 15% of the common budget of the EU
funds, provided by the financial agreements of
these countries with the EU. It is evident that in
all the above-mentioned member-states the
assimilation process of the funds in the
beginning of their membership is relatively low.
As a whole, the net effect from the EU
membership over the budget is negative, due to
the duty of co-financing the projects of the EU
funds from the state budgets, the advanced
financing of the approved projects, the
countries’ contributions to the EU, and the costs
of sustaining a larger administration as a result
of administering the subsidies and transfers.
Some of the widespread myths about the EU
funds are the following:
1) The EU Funds must be 100%
assimilated.
Bulgaria is the country for which the biggest
amount of subsidies and relief funds from the
Structural and Cohesion Funds as a percent of
GDP has been agreed upon. The fear that the
country would not be able to take a full
advantage of this “privilege” and to assimilate
all money is one of the leading criticisms against
both the politicians and the business circles in
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the country. However, in reality the assimilation
of funds depends not only on the administrative
capacity, but also on the macroeconomic
capacity of the country to undertake specific
projects in exchange for the provided money.
The distribution of funds in different sectors
depends on the re-assigned, centrally prepared
tasks and priorities. The real needs of the
economy may be differentiated from the
guaranteed spheres of financing. The desire to
assimilate all resources at any cost in this case
will lead to big distortions in the economy,
changes in the relative prices of goods and
services, pro-inflation pressures, and to
implementation of projects which later on appear
to be unprofitable.
The interventions distort the behavior of the
entrepreneurs. Instead of striving for increasing
their output, some firms will make more profits
if they design projects with which to apply for
EU funding. However, the logic of the market is
exactly the opposite- an entrepreneur conceives
a business idea and then he looks for ways to
finance it. The market functions on the principle
of natural selection and these projects, which
possess the biggest potential to become
profitable, are financed. The investment of own
resources is an incentive for entrepreneurs and
investors in order to correctly evaluate projects
and to aim at making a minimal number of
mistakes in their evaluations. This is not
applicable to officials who operate with
somebody else’s, not their own, money.
2) The control in the EU over the
spending of the resources from the EU
Funds is more reliable and the
misappropriations are less.
The mechanism of distributing the subsidies and
relief funds is related to large transaction costs
over the construction of clumsy administrative
structures. The aggregate amount of resources
from the EU funds, which should be distributed
among the 27 EU member-states in 2007, adds
up to approximately 100 billion euro.
Everywhere in the world the concentration of
excessive power and discretion in the hands of
public organs creates pre-conditions for the
formation of corruption, rent-seeking, and
lobbying for the interests of certain groups.
Scandals and disclosures of abuses of EU funds
are an inseparable part of the EU existence and
are not characteristic only of Bulgaria and
Romania, or the Eastern European countries as a
whole, but also of countries of “Old Europe”
like Greece and Italy. It is indicative that already
12 years in a row the European Chamber of
Accounts does not certify the EU budget due to
omissions and suspicions of abuses, and of
“mistakes in the legality and regularity” of
reporting the common funds.
3) The poor regions may achieve more
substantial economic growth through
receiving money, without making any
effort.
The prosperity and long-term economic growth
may only be a result of the rise in the labor
productivity and the increase of investment and
capital in the economy, but not a result of the
artificial increase of money aggregation in the
economy. Some studies have appeared that
prove that the attraction of technological
innovations in regions with untrained labor
force, insufficient resources, and inappropriate
conditions for the development of high-
technological business may lead to more costs
for people than potential benefits.
On the other hand, subsidies create a culture of
dependence and do not stimulate the innovations
and the enterprising spirit of the market players.
For example, subsidies are the reason for making
short-sighted decisions and sustaining
unprofitable and losing productions. The
Community policy in the sphere of banana
production stimulates the European producers in
France and Spain to raise the output, although
their costs are times higher than the costs of
Latin American producers. In the long run,
without relying on the EU officials for their
support, the producers will go bankrupt.
The conclusion is that the EU funds will not
solve the country’s inherent problems related to
low incomes and unsatisfactory quality of
services in some public spheres like the
education and healthcare spheres. In order to
improve the well-being of people, real economic
reforms and maintaining of favorable
institutional and political environment are
necessary tools.
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The Legislature in Bulgaria: What happens
There?
Veliko Dimitrov
In order to get a more precise notion about the
“evolution” of the legislative assembly and the
law-making process in Bulgaria, we could
examine the Parliament in two aspects, namely,
in the micro and macro aspects. Each of these
aspects possesses its own characteristic features
and probably dynamics (although it is not clear
in which direction each kind of dynamics
develops). On the first level is the way of life of
every member of Parliament, and on the second
level is the combination of all 240 deputies,
respectively the law-making process and, on a
larger scale, the economic development of the
country (this last allusion does not howsoever
come into question, taking into consideration the
availability of a great number of similar
writings- some economic in nature, with or
without meaning; others sociological, written by
politicians, including ministers,1 as all those
mentioned categories are of course
complementary to each other).
The micro-level of the legislation has a few
unique attributes. Some individuals, “units” in
the legislative process among which are specific
political leaders, are regularly absent from the
Parliamentary sessions (which literally means
absent from the official positions and duties
bestowed on them by the people). Other “units”
in the legislation, colleagues of the afore-
mentioned politicians, like to play the role of
“substitutes” for them, even for several
politicians at the same time, despite the fact that
at the time of general elections, as well as at the
time of voting in the Parliament, every deputy
still has only his/her own vote at his/her
disposal. And polygamy is against the law!
1 Strangely, but it appears that the Minister for State
Administration has written with his own hand a short
macroeconomic review with adjoining evaluations,
which probably, despite the positive intentions of the
author to clarify a bit basic economic issues to his
boss, should not be read by beginners in economics.
The review can be found here. Still, it is worth noting
that minister Vasilev by himself, in contrast to almost
all of his colleagues, can write or tell something
which is not a pure populism, nonsense, or just a bad
sense of humor.
Other landmarks from the Parliamentary
landscape are also the regular interviews
willingly given by the national law-makers,
something which does not represent a negative
aspect by itself. But the manner in which the
interviews are given is definitely negative. The
interviews are not about views and convictions,
but mostly about political parties, officials and
their faults, and respectively about foreseeable
and logical results. Moreover, the interviews
appear to be about people, while in reality the
emphasis is only on specific groups of the
society; often the interviews comprise the term
“public,” while in reality they are all about the
“state” (for example, state orders which, as it is
well-known, represent the basic mechanism
through which the state buys goods and
services). The interviews are also about politics,
government and leadership, but they are actually
about the formation of conditions (whatever they
could be) as well as about harmonization, when
de facto, with some exceptions, only a particular
set of rules, between which one should choose,
should be taken into consideration.
What is happening on the macro-level of the
legislation? A few very important things for
sure:
1. According to the Statute for the
Organization and Functions of the
National Assembly,2 the bills must be
introduced along with binding motives,
which must also include an evaluation of
the expected consequences including the
financial aftermath.
It is an open secret that such an evaluation is not
usually made, although, except in the Statute,
such a requirement is also written down in the
Law for Restricting the Administrative
Regulation and Control over the Economic
Activities. Indeed this law has to do solely with
introduction of regulatory regimes (a part of the
regulations) which duly means that in specific
cases the inaction infringes one act, while in
other cases- two or more acts.
2. In order to present public motives (it
is clear that there is no evaluation), it
follows that there should be a text of a
bill to which to apply these motives. At
the time of their introduction, all bills
should be immediately registered in the
Public Register for “Bills” and they
2 You can read here.
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should be accessible on the webpage of
the National Assembly.
In part of the cases this requirement is observed,
but experience shows that there is a number of
bills whose contents are completely missing,
which is inadmissible.
Let me give you a few examples:* the current 11
bills are examined as the ratifications are
excluded. In the following 6 bills all kind of
content is completely missing.
- A Bill for Amendment to the Code of
Social Security (look here)
- A Bill for Amendment to the Law of
Corporate Income Taxation (look here)
- A Bill for Amendment to the Law of
State Orders (look here)
- A Bill for Amendment to the Law of
Income Taxes over Physical Persons
(look here)
- A Bill for Amendment to the Law of the
Political Parties (look here)
- A Bill for Amendment to the Law of
Elections of Members from the Republic
of Bulgaria for the European Parliament
(look here)
3. It is not clear in what order the bills enter
the Parliament. There are no explicitly
written rules which can determine certain
logic and order in the examination of the
introduced bills (for instance, by date of
introduction or by allocation to a leading
commission). In that way a part of the
proposals are delayed with months and
years, while other proposals (introduced by
the Council of Ministers, i.e. by the ruling
majority) are discussed and accepted with
priority. From the first 35 proposals in the
present Parliament, there is not even one bill
introduced by the Council of Ministers
which is under a regime of discussion, while
there are some bills under discussion
introduced by particular deputies (some of
these bills were introduced more than a year
and a half ago).
4. To what extent do the law makers possess
the initiative to accept standards, regardless
of the executive?
In Bulgaria the Council of Ministers, as well as
all members of Parliament have the right of
initiating legislative acts. From all 664 bills
introduced in the Parliament till the present
moment almost half of them (331) are initiations
by the Council of Ministers. The rest (333) are
introduced by one or more members of
Parliament, including those elected members
belonging to one of the three political parties
forming the ruling coalition. It could be accepted
that more than half of the proposals are directly
or indirectly introduced by the government, or in
other words, by the executive, not by the
legislature.
Having this in mind, it has often happened to me
to level criticisms against the members of
Parliament with respect to certain proposals.
Probably the right thing to do is to direct a share
of my criticisms towards the government as the
actual carrier of around 50 and more percent of
the state power (it is not 1/3 of the state power as
recognized in the books representing the idea
about the perfect division of power between the
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary).
* The complete database of the register for “Bills”
can be accessed on this webpage:
http://www.parliament.bg/?page=app&lng=bg&
aid=4&action=execute
A Supreme Absurdity
Peter Ganev
In 1999 the Bologna Declaration for the creation
of a European Higher Education Area was
signed. This document, as a turning point in the
development of higher education in Europe, was
signed by 29 countries including Bulgaria. The
Bologna Declaration clearly outlines the ever-
growing need for greater independence and
autonomy of universities as a major factor in the
development of Europe.
A failed reform
Just a few hours ago the Bulgarian government
manifested that it could in no way adopt these
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values. According to the results from the second
reading in the Parliament about changes in the
Higher Education Law, universities will not be
able to determine on their own the tuition fees
and the number of enrolled students (which
means that there are no changes here), but
instead at every state university a Board of
Trustees will be created which will include
people, outside the university body.
The establishment of these boards has been
widely discussed in the social circles in the
preceding month but nobody, in general, could
explain for what exactly these boards are
necessary (they are created by law, not by an
initiative of the higher educational institution
itself) and how come these boards of trustees
correspond with the idea about independence
and autonomy of universities? In your opinion,
what can a Board of Trustees do, except
“insisting” that various things should be done?
Although the interference of such a board of
trustees in the administration of universities
clashes with the idea of autonomy of the
academic community, it was not this change that
drew the attention. The entire discussion about
reforming the system of higher education was
initiated by the Minister for Education himself,
Daniel Vulchev, who also promoted the idea to
give universities the right to determine their own
tuition fees and number of enrolled students. In
fact, that was the excuse for the creation of a
Board of Trustees. Let the higher educational
institutions have more freedom in order to be
able to compete effectively but, anyway, in order
not to make a mess in the field let’s create a
Board of Trustees that should supervise and
restrict “(excessive) freedom.” At first sight it
seemed that the above-mentioned line of thought
was in balance with all standpoints and interests.
However, things appeared to be completely
different.
Again about tuition fees
Where has this fear of increased tuition fees
come from? If there was something that
intercepted the desire for changes in the higher
education (if there has been such a desire at all!),
that undoubtedly was the perception for potential
rise of tuition fees. Medical students would
almost have to pay around 4000 leva (2 045
euro) because that amount of money represented
the allowance for a student of medicine. The
allowance may be 4000 leva but as if everybody
forgets that the right of universities to determine
higher tuition fees does not mean an immediate
reduction of state subsidies for students.
Universities will again be financially provided
for, even if they do not raise the fees. Even the
first-year students in economics know about the
so called equilibrium of demand and supply and
nobody can afford to determine unrealistically
high prices for no matter what products or
services. There will definitely be universities
which will increase their tuition fees but that will
be as a direct result of the quality of education.
Student credit financing
One of the widespread opinions at the time of
the discussions of the law and, more specifically,
of the tuition fees was that the changes should be
made in a moment when an active system for
student credits is constructed. It is not a secret
that anything like students’ crediting does not
exist in Bulgaria. Despite the substantial number
of credits under this name, these are always
connected with proof of sufficient income by the
student if he/she by accident works, or by a
parent who in practice repays the loan. There are
a few reasons why this kind of credit, when a
loan is issued to the student (the loan can be
repaid by the student when he/she starts working
after graduation) only on the basis of
recommendations and results from the relevant
university, has not still taken place in Bulgaria.
One of the reasons is directly related with the
market and with the fact that our financial
system is still under development, and these
high-risk credits are yet to begin entering the
market.
The second reason, probably the more serious
one, is absolutely unrelated to the market, but is
determined by the perpetual intention of the state
to enter into the “credit” undertaking. Which
ordinary creditor is about to invest and profit
from student credits is the state, sooner or later,
will start giving such credits under much simpler
(not market) conditions, as the credits might not
even be repaid? This anti-market behavior,
which not only will not yield profits, but also
will be financed through the budget, is the
absolute barrier for everybody who would like to
enter the market.
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